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Китайская поэзия - Тзу - Sun Tzu. On the art of warСтаринные >> Китайская поэзия
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Sun Tzu. On the art of war
SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR
THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD
Translated from the Chinese
By LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1910)
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From: V.Boldin (boldin@mail.south.ru)
яЛ. РЮЙФЕ: яСМЭЖГШ. хЯЙСЯЯРБН БНИМШ
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1.Laying Plans
2.Waging War
3.Attack by Stratagem
4.Tactical Dispositions
5.Energy
6.Weak Points and Strong
7.Maneuvering
8.Variation in Tactics
9.The Army on the March
10.Terrain
11.The Nine Situations
12.The Attack by Fire
13.The Use of Spies
[This is the basic text of Sun Tzu on the Art of War. It was
extracted from Mr. Giles' complete work as titled above. The
commentary itself, which, of course includes this work embedded
within it, has been released as suntzu10.txt (or suntzu10.zip).
This is being released only as an adjunct to that work, which
contains a wealth of commentary upon this text.]
I. LAYING PLANS
1.Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to
the State. 2.It is a matter of life and death, a road either to
safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can
on no account be neglected. 3.The art of war, then, is governed
by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's
deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions
obtaining in the field. 4.These are:
1.The Moral Law; 2.Heaven; 3.Earth; 4.The Commander;
5.Method and discipline.
5.The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord
with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of
their lives, undismayed by any danger. 6. 7.Heaven signifies
night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. 8.Earth
comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open
ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. 9.The
Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely,
benevolence, courage and strictness. 10.By method and
discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in
its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the
officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach
the army, and the control of military expenditure. 11.These
five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows
them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
12.Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine
the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a
comparison, in this wise:-- 13.
1.Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral
law? 2.Which of the two generals has most ability? 3.With whom
lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? 4.On which
side is discipline most rigorously enforced? 5.Which army is
stronger? 6.On which side are officers and men more highly
trained? 7.In which army is there the greater constancy both in
reward and punishment?
14.By means of these seven considerations I can forecast
victory or defeat. 15.The general that hearkens to my counsel
and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in
command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts
upon it, will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed!
16.While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also
of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary
rules. 17.According as circumstances are favorable, one should
modify one's plans. 18.All warfare is based on deception.
19.Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using
our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must
make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must
make him believe we are near. 20.Hold out baits to entice the
enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. 21.If he is secure at all
points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength,
evade him. 22.If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to
irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
23.If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces
are united, separate them. 24.Attack him where he is
unprepared, appear where you are not expected. 25.These
military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged
beforehand. 26.Now the general who wins a battle makes many
calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The
general who loses a battle makes but few calculations
beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few
calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It
is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely
to win or lose.
II. WAGING WAR
1.Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are
in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots,
and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions
enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and
at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items
such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor,
will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.
Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. 2.When you
engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then
men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If
you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
3.Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the
State will not be equal to the strain. 4.Now, when your weapons
are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your
treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take
advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be
able to avert the consequences that must ensue. 5.Thus, though
we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been
seen associated with long delays. 6.There is no instance of a
country having benefited from prolonged warfare. 7.It is only
one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can
thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
8.The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither
are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. 9.Bring war
material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the
army will have food enough for its needs. 10.Poverty of the
State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by
contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army
at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. 11.On the
other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up;
and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained
away. 12.When their substance is drained away, the peasantry
will be afflicted by heavy exactions. 13.With this loss of
substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people
will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be
dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots,
worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows,
spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy
wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. 14.
15.Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy.
One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty
of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is
equivalent to twenty from one's own store. 16.Now in order to
kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may
be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their
rewards. 17.Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more
chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the
first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the
enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with
ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
18.This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own
strength. 19.In war, then, let your great object be victory,
not lengthy campaigns. 20.Thus it may be known that the leader
of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom
it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.
III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM
1.Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best
thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact;
to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better
to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a
regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy
them. 2.Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not
supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the
enemy's resistance without fighting. 3.Thus the highest form of
generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to
prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order
is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst
policy of all is to besiege walled cities. 4.The rule is, not
to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The
preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various
implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the
piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three
months more. 5.The general, unable to control his irritation,
will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the
result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town
still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a
siege. 6.Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's
troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without
laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without
lengthy operations in the field. 7.With his forces intact he
will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without
losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method
of attacking by stratagem. 8.It is the rule in war, if our
forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to
one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army
into two. 9.If equally matched, we can offer battle; if
slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite
unequal in every way, we can flee from him. 10.Hence, though an
obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it
must be captured by the larger force. 11.Now the general is the
bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points;
the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the
State will be weak. 12.There are three ways in which a ruler
can bring misfortune upon his army:-- 13.(1) By commanding the
army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that
it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. 14.(2) By
attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers
a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an
army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. 15.(3)
By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,
through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to
circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
16.But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is
sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply
bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
17.Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
1.He will win who knows when to fight and when not to
fight. 2.He will win who knows how to handle both superior and
inferior forces. 3.He will win whose army is animated by the
same spirit throughout all its ranks. 4.He will win who,
prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. 5.He will
win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the
sovereign.
18.Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know
yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If
you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained
you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy
nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS
1.Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put
themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited
for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. 2.To secure
ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the
opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy
himself. 3.Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself
against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
4.Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being
able to do it. 5.Security against defeat implies defensive
tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the
offensive. 6.Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient
strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. 7.The
general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret
recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes
forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand
we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory
that is complete. 8.To see victory only when it is within the
ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. 9.Neither
is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the
whole Empire says, "Well done!" 10.To lift an autumn hair is no
sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of
sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick
ear. 11.What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who
not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. 12.Hence his
victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit
for courage. 13.He wins his battles by making no mistakes.
Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of
victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already
defeated. 14.Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a
position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the
moment for defeating the enemy. 15.Thus it is that in war the
victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has
been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and
afterwards looks for victory. 16.The consummate leader
cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and
discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. 17.In
respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement;
secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation;
fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
18.Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of
quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity;
Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing
of chances. 19.A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as
a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
20.The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of
pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.
V. ENERGY
1.Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same
principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question
of dividing up their numbers. 2.Fighting with a large army
under your command is nowise different from fighting with a
small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and
signals. 3.To ensure that your whole host may withstand the
brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken-- this is
effected by maneuvers direct and indirect. 4.That the impact of
your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg--this
is effected by the science of weak points and strong. 5.In all
fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but
indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
6.Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as
Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;
like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the
four seasons, they pass away to return once more. 7.There are
not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these
five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. 8.There
are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red,
white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues
than can ever been seen. 9.There are not more than five
cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet
combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be
tasted. 10.In battle, there are not more than two methods of
attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two in
combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. 11.The
direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is
like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. Who can
exhaust the possibilities of their combination? 12.The onset of
troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll
stones along in its course. 13.The quality of decision is like
the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and
destroy its victim. 14.Therefore the good fighter will be
terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision. 15.Energy
may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the
releasing of a trigger. 16.Amid the turmoil and tumult of
battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder
at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without
head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. 17.Simulated
disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear
postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
18.Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a
question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of
timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength
with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.
19.Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move
maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy
will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at
it. 20.By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then
with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. 21.The
clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and
does not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability
to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy. 22.When
he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were
like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log
or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when
on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if
round-shaped, to go rolling down. 23.Thus the energy developed
by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled
down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the
subject of energy.
VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG
1.Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits
the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever
is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive
exhausted. 2.Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on
him. 3.By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy
to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can
make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. 4.If the enemy
is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with
food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force
him to move. 5.Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to
defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
6.An army may march great distances without distress, if it
marches through country where the enemy is not. 7.You can be
sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places
which are undefended.You can ensure the safety of your defense
if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked. 8.Hence
that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know
what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent
does not know what to attack. 9.O divine art of subtlety and
secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you
inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
10.You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make
for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from
pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the
enemy. 11.If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an
engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart
and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place
that he will be obliged to relieve. 12.If we do not wish to
fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though
the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground.
All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in
his way. 13.By discovering the enemy's dispositions and
remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces
concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided. 14.We can form
a single united body, while the enemy must split up into
fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate
parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the
enemy's few. 15.And if we are able thus to attack an inferior
force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire
straits. 16.The spot where we intend to fight must not be made
known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a
possible attack at several different points; and his forces
being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall
have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
17.For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his
rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van;
should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should
he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends
reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.
18.Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against
possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our
adversary to make these preparations against us. 19.Knowing the
place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate
from the greatest distances in order to fight. 20.But if
neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be
impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to
succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the
rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest
portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and
even the nearest are separated by several LI! 21.Though
according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in
number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of
victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. 22.Though the
enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting.
Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their
success. 23.Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity
or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out
his vulnerable spots. 24.Carefully compare the opposing army
with your own, so that you may know where strength is
superabundant and where it is deficient. 25.In making tactical
dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal
them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the
prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the
wisest brains. 26.How victory may be produced for them out of
the enemy's own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot
comprehend. 27.All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer,
but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is
evolved. 28.Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one
victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite
variety of circumstances. 29.Military tactics are like unto
water; for water in its natural course runs away from high
places and hastens downwards. 30.So in war, the way is to avoid
what is strong and to strike at what is weak. 31.Water shapes
its course according to the nature of the ground over which it
flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe
whom he is facing. 32.Therefore, just as water retains no
constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
33.He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent
and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born
captain. 34.The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth)
are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way
for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon
has its periods of waning and waxing.
VII. MANEUVERING
... ... ...
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Sun Tzu. On the art of war